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Introduction 
‘The function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies 
when duties have been breached.’1  The purpose of this article is to explore the extent 
to which the English courts pursue a vindicatory function when awarding a remedy 
for breach of contract and, in particular, to examine the function of contractual 
damages.  Vindication describes the making good of the claimant’s legal right by the 
grant of an adequate remedy.  Unless an infringed right is met with an adequate 
remedy, the right is ‘a hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all 
content’.2  As society becomes more rights-focused and English law more rights-
based,3 the vindicatory function is likely to become increasingly evident.  In this piece 
two related claims concerning vindication are put forward.  The first is that the 
English courts already recognise that their primary objective in awarding a remedy for 
breach of contract is the vindication of the claimant’s rights under that contract.  
While the limited availability of specific relief and the preference for compensation as 
a substitute for performance suggest that contractual rights are vindicated only in a 
weak sense, closer examination of conventional compensatory principles reveals that 
compensation is very much a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  That end is 
the making good of the claimant’s right to performance of the contract.  The second 
claim is that a discrete remedy, vindicatory damages, may be identified in contract 
cases.  Up until the ‘new start’4 heralded by the decision in Attorney-General v. 
Blake,5 it was commonly accepted that damages for breach of contract were 
exclusively loss-based.6  The fundamental basis of contractual damages was to 
compensate ‘for pecuniary loss naturally flowing from the breach’.7  But in Blake, the 
House of Lords acknowledged that English ‘law does not adhere slavishly to the 
concept of compensation for financially measurable loss’: damages may be measured 
                                                 
∗ A revised version of this article has been accepted for publication in the Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, © 2007 David Pearce and Roger Halson, published by Oxford University Press.  All rights 
reserved. 
∗∗ Lecturer in law and Professor in law respectively, at the University of Leeds.  David Pearce is the 
principal author of this article.  We should like to thank Horton Rogers for his comments on an earlier 
draft of this piece.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 A.C. 134 at para. 87 per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
2 Ibid. 
3 As far as statutory developments are concerned, examples include the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
4 Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc. [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] E.M.L.R. 25 at 
para. 16 per Mance L.J. 
5 [2001] 1 A.C. 268. 
6 Nominal damages aside. 
7 British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of 
London Ltd. [1912] A.C. 673 at 689 per Viscount Haldane L.C.  Similarly, see Farley v. Skinner 
[2001] UKHL 49; [2002] 2 A.C. 732 at para. 16 per Lord Steyn: the ‘general principle is that 
compensation is only awarded for financial loss resulting from the breach of contract’.  For recovery of 
non-pecuniary loss see Watts v. Morrow [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1421 and Farley v. Skinner (ibid.) 
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by the gain made by the defendant.8  The precise nature of such damages has proved 
controversial.  Some judges and commentators maintain that gain-based damages are 
restitutionary, others, that the damages remain compensatory.  The better view, it is 
suggested, is that these damages are vindicatory in nature.  Vindicatory damages, 
which to date have only been explicitly recognised in the context of constitutional 
rights,9 are neither loss-based nor gain-based: they are a rights-based remedy.  As 
well as providing a just remedy in suitable cases, vindicatory damages offer a further 
benefit.  For at present, the concept of loss in English contract law is in danger of 
being over-stretched.  Extending the availability of vindicatory damages to 
contractual actions would provide a more accurate explanation of the remedy awarded 
in certain cases and would help to preserve the coherence of the conventional 
remedies of compensation and restitution. 
 
The right to performance 
It is important at the outset to clarify the extent of the rights which a party acquires 
under a contract.  When entering into a bilateral, or synallagmatic, contract, each 
party acquires ‘a legal right to the performance of the contract’10 and at the same time 
‘assumes a legally recognised and enforceable obligation to perform’ it.11  For ‘the 
purpose of contract is performance’.12  Pacta sunt servanda.  Liability in contract may 
be contrasted with that imposed in the tort of negligence.  The obligation in 
negligence is ‘an obligation to compensate the claimant against loss which was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of his carelessness’.13  Liability in negligence is 
founded ‘not on the act but on the consequences’ of the act.14  ‘There is no free 
standing obligation or duty of care.’15  Liability in contract, by contrast, is founded on 
the act of agreement.16  The most obvious means of vindicating the claimant’s right to 
performance of the contract is to order the defendant to perform.  Where the relevant 
obligation is to convey an interest in land, or refrain from doing something, or pay a 
sum of money, the English courts will generally vindicate the claimant’s 
corresponding right by an order of specific performance, by an injunction, or by 
judgment for the fixed sum.  But specific relief, particularly in the form of an order 
for specific performance or an injunction, nevertheless remains the exception rather 
than the rule in contract.  While the vindicatory function may be becoming 
increasingly evident, recent cases reveal a disinclination to expand the availability of 
                                                 
8 A.-G. v. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 285 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead.  The actual remedy 
awarded in Blake was not damages but an account of profits.  As to whether this is a distinction 
without a difference, see World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment 
Inc. [2007] EWCA Civ 286; [2007] All E.R. (D.) 13 (Apr.) at para. 58 et seq. per Chadwick L.J. 
9 See The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 A.C. 328 
and Merson v. Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38; [2006] 3 L.R.C. 264. 
10 Alley v. Deschamps (1806) 13 Ves. Jun. 25 at 27-28 per Lord Erskine. 
11 In Re T & N Ltd. [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1728 at para. 26 per David Richards J. 
12 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. [1983] Q.B. 284 at 304 per Oliver L.J. 
13 In Re T & N Ltd. [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1728 at para. 25 per David Richards J. 
14 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) [1961] 
A.C. 388 at 425 per Viscount Simonds. 
15 In Re T & N Ltd. [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1728 at para. 25 per David Richards J. 
16 This distinction has been acted upon by the House of Lords in the context of an award of interest on 
damages (Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v. Edward Erdman Group Ltd. (No. 2) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1627) 
and more recently with regard to the date of accrual of a cause of action for limitation purposes (Law 
Society v. Sephton & Co. [2006] UKHL 22; [2006] 2 A.C. 543). 
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specific relief in contract generally.17  In Co-op v. Argyll18 the House of Lords, by 
reversing the majority decision of the Court of Appeal,19 declined an opportunity to 
bring English law into line with other systems as regards the specific enforceability of 
contractual duties.20  In English law the ‘presumption’ remains that any breach of 
contract will result in an obligation on the defaulting party to pay damages.21   
 
The demise of nominal damages 
Turning to damages, it may be thought that the remedy of nominal damages fulfils a 
vindicatory function.  For nominal damages are ‘not intended to compensate for 
anything at all’ but are awarded simply ‘to mark the fact that there has been a breach 
of contract’.22  But it soon becomes apparent that nominal damages offer little hope of 
making good the claimant’s performance right.  First, nominal damages have limited 
relevance in contractual claims in practice.23  While nominal damages may be used as 
a way of establishing a legal right, they will generally be so used in the context of 
property, and not contractual, rights.24  In any event, the availability of the declaration 
has rendered this aspect of nominal damages increasingly redundant.25  Further, there 
are signs that the ‘main purpose’26 of nominal damages, that of acting as a peg on 
which to hang costs,27 has been undermined by the courts’ reluctance to adopt in 
mechanical fashion the principle that costs follow the event where that event is no 
more than the award of nominal damages.  In Anglo-Cyprian v. Paphos the claimant 
failed in its principal claim for breach of contract damages of around £2,000, 
succeeding only on an alternative claim for £52.28  Devlin J., having noted the general 
rule that a successful claimant will recover his costs from the defendant, nevertheless 
ordered this claimant to pay the defendant’s costs: ‘I do not think that a plaintiff who 
recovers nominal damages ought necessarily to be regarded in the ordinary sense of 
the word as a “successful” plaintiff.’29  This approach was followed in Mappouras v. 
                                                 
17 Thereby departing from earlier authorities, such as C H Giles & Co v. Morris [1972] 1 W.L.R. 307, 
Tito v. Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 321 and Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 
576, hinting at a wider availability for specific relief.  
18 Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. [1998] A.C. 1. The case 
concerned a ‘keep trading’ covenant in a lease.  However, cf. Thames Valley Power Ltd v. Total Gas & 
Power Ltd [2005] EWHC 2208 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 441 where the court, obiter, appeared 
to endorse a wider concept of uniqueness and consequent availability of specific relief.  
19 [1996] Ch. 286. 
20 See, e.g., Highland and Universal Properties Ltd. v. Safeway Properties Ltd. 2000 S.L.T. 414. 
21 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. [1983] Q.B. 284 at 304 per Oliver L.J. 
22 Mappouras v. Waldrons [2002] EWCA Civ 842; [2002] All E.R. (D.) 299 (Apr.) at para. 15 per Kay 
L.J.  In Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49; [2002] 2 AC 732 at para. 40 Lord Clyde said ‘…damages 
should not be awarded, unless perhaps nominally, for the fact of a breach of contract as distinct from 
the consequences of that breach’. 
23 See for example, Treitel’s The Law of Contract: nominal damages are not mentioned in the index and 
merit treatment of less than a half-a-dozen lines in the main text (11th edn., (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003) at 926-7).  Chitty on Contracts discusses nominal damages in a single paragraph: 
Beale, H., (gen. ed.), Chitty on Contracts 29th edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at para. 26-008; 
(hereafter, Chitty on Contracts).  
24 McGregor, H., McGregor on Damages, 17th edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at para. 10-
009;  (hereafter, McGregor on Damages). 
25 Thus, Burrows who, having noted the function of the declaration, concludes that nominal damages 
‘are superfluous and could happily be abolished’: Burrows, A., Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract, 3rd edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at 589. 
26 McGregor on Damages at para. 10-009. 
27 Beaumont v. Greathead (1846) 2 C.B. 494 at 499 per Maule J. 
28 Anglo-Cyprian Trade Agencies Ltd v. Paphos Wine Industries Ltd [1951] 1 All E.R. 873. 
29 Ibid., at 874 per Devlin J. 
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Waldrons, where the claimant, who had been awarded £15 in nominal damages, was 
ordered to pay the defendant’s trial and appeal costs, the latter alone being assessed at 
£3,000.30  Such Pyrrhic victories undermine rather than vindicate the claimant’s right 
to performance of the contract.  Further in Clarke v. Buckle Mellows the Court of 
Appeal declined to award nominal damages where the claimant was unable to prove 
that the defendant’s breach of contract had caused the claimant any loss and upheld 
the trial judge’s order of costs against the claimant.31
Nominal damages may be seen to lack a vindicatory element in another way.  
An award of a pound or two32 is unlikely in itself to provide adequate satisfaction for 
the wrong.33  An award of nominal damages differs little, if at all, from an award of 
derisory, or contemptuous, damages.  Derisory damages serve to indicate ‘that while a 
right has technically been infringed, the court has formed a very low opinion of the 
claimant’s bare legal claim, or that his conduct was such that he deserved, at any rate 
morally, what the defendant did to him.’34  In theory, then, nominal and derisory 
damages serve different purposes.  In practice, it can be hard to distinguish between 
the two.  For example, in Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., the House of 
Lords unanimously substituted an award of £1 damages in place of the jury’s award of 
£85,000.35  Lord Bingham of Cornhill, with whose speech Lord Millett agreed, Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough and Lord Scott of Foscote each expressly identified the 
award as one of nominal damages.36  Yet there can be little doubt as to their 
Lordships’ views as to the merits of the case.  ‘It would be an affront to justice,’ Lord 
Bingham said, ‘if a court of law were to award substantial damages to a man shown to 
have acted in such flagrant breach of his legal and moral obligations’.37  Both Lord 
Steyn and Lord Millett described the award as ‘derisory’.38   
Rather than marking the infringement of a legal right where there is no ‘moral 
obliquity on the claimant’s part’,39 nominal damages today may indicate a lack of any 
                                                 
30 [2002] EWCA Civ 842.  In Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v. Salisbury Hamer 
Aspden and Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879, The Independent 18 June 2002, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision of the trial judge, who, having awarded the claimant nominal damages of £2, 
ordered the claimant to pay the defendant’s costs on the indemnity basis. 
31 [2005] EWCA Civ 1611, especially at paras. 55, 59 and 73. 
32 There seems to be little consistency in the amount of an award of nominal damages: awards of £1, 
£2, £5, £10, and £15 can all be found in the cases.  In Liverpool C.C. v. Irwin [1977] A.C. 239 at 264 
and 270, the House of Lords reduced the nominal damages awarded by the County Court judge from 
£10 to £5.  In the Court of Appeal, Roskill L.J. had also questioned the award of £10.  However he 
thought that the proper figure for such an award was £2 ([1976] Q.B. 319 at 333).  In Radford v. De 
Froberville [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262 at 1268 Oliver J. assumed nominal damages to be the decimal 
equivalent of 40 shillings.  This figure may have its origins in the practice of the royal courts in the 
thirteenth century to exclude claims for less than 40 shillings: see Baker, J.H., An Introduction to 
English Legal History 4th edn., (London: Butterworths, 2002) at 22. 
33 In Blake, Lord Nicholls commented ([2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 283) that if the claimants in Wrotham 
Park had only been awarded nominal damages, justice would manifestly not have been done.  Contrast 
Constantine v. Imperial Hotels Ltd. [1944] K.B. 693 where the claimant was awarded nominal 
damages of five guineas.  Rogers notes that ‘this sum would now be at least £100’: Rogers, W.V.H., 
Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 17th edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) para. 22-7.  (Hereafter, 
Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort). 
34 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort at para. 22-6. 
35 [2002] UKHL 40; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 3024. 
36 Ibid., at para. 27 (Lord Bingham), para. 61 (Lord Hobhouse), and para. 87 (Lord Scott). 
37 Ibid. at para. 24. 
38 Ibid. at paras. 36 and 69 respectively. 
39 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort at para. 22-7. 
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substantive merit in the claimant’s case.  In Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland40 
Jacob J. rejected the claimant’s argument that an award of nominal damages for 
infringement of copyright lay even where the claimant’s actions led to the denial of 
equitable relief:  ‘A plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages has in reality lost 
and in reality the defendant has established a complete defence.’41  Such an approach 
calls into question the continuing presence of nominal damages in the courts’ 
remedial armoury, a fact explicitly envisaged in Ibekwe v. T.G.W.U.42  In that case, 
the claims against the defendant for breach of contract had been struck out at trial on 
the ground that the claimants had failed to show that the breaches had caused any loss.  
The Court of Appeal allowed the claimants’ appeals on the ground that the judge had 
misapplied the burden of proof.  But Peter Gibson L.J., with whom Latham L.J. 
agreed, was ‘much more doubtful’43 about the claimants’ alternative ground of 
appeal, that the fact of breach entitled them to nominal damages.  Peter Gibson L.J. 
thought it might be ‘well within’ the court’s discretion under the Civil Procedure 
Rules to stop a case where it became clear that the claimant would only recover 
nominal damages.44  The court had to ‘avoid incurring unnecessary costs and taking 
up a disproportionate amount of’ its own time.45  In summary, nominal damages may 
be seen to provide an inadequate means in practice of vindicating contractual rights. 
 
Vindication and compensation 
In practice, in the vast majority of cases, the claimant’s performance right is 
vindicated by an award of compensatory damages.  While compensation has as its 
immediate object the making good of a loss,46 the scope of the duty to compensate 
which the law imposes on a defendant who breaks his contract, reveals a underlying 
vindicatory object.  It is important to bear in mind first the different measures of loss 
adopted in contract and tort.  Contractual damages are generally awarded so as to 
protect the claimant’s expectation interest, to give him the benefit of the bargain: the 
claimant ‘is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation with respect 
to damages as if the contract had been performed.’47  The primacy of this measure of 
damages for breach of contract is reflected by its description as the contract 
measure.48  This may be contrasted with the objective in tort, where the court awards 
damages so as to put the claimant ‘in the same position as he would have been in if he 
had not sustained the wrong’.49  Suppose the defendant dishonestly induces the 
claimant to enter a contract to buy the defendant’s car by making a false statement of 
fact.  The statement is found to have been incorporated as a term of the contract.  The 
claimant pays £5,000 for a car which has a market value of £4,000.  Had the statement 
been true, the car would have been worth £7,000.  As every law student ought to 
                                                 
40 [1999] R.P.C. 655.  Jacob J.’s actual decision, that the defendants had not infringed the claimant’s 
copyright, was reversed by the Court of Appeal: see [2001] Ch. 143. 
41 [1999] R.P.C. 655 at paras. 36-37. 
42 [2001] EWCA Civ 432; [2001] All E.R. (D.) 178 (Mar.).   
43 Ibid., at para. 26. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd. v. Panatown Ltd.[2001] 1 A.C. 518 at 580 per Lord Millett. See 
generally Mckendrick. E. “Breach of Contract and the Meaning of Loss” (1999) Current Legal 
Problems 37. 
47 Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Exch. 850 at 855 per Parke B. 
48 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v. Edward Erdman Group Ltd. (No. 2) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1627 at 1634 
per Lord Nicholls.  In Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co. [1911] A.C. 301 at 307 this measure was 
described as the ‘ruling principle’ of contract damages. 
49 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25 at 39 per Lord Blackburn. 
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know,50 the claimant could recover damages of £1,000 in the tort of deceit51 or 
£2,000 for breach of contract.52  Thus the duty to compensate imposed in contract is 
more onerous than that imposed in tort, because the respective duties seek to vindicate 
different rights.53  Contractual damages vindicate the performance right: they put the 
claimant in the same position as if the defendant had performed his promise.  The 
difference between damages in contract and tort,54 is further brought out by the 
‘important’ distinction in breach of contract claims between normal and consequential 
loss.55  McGregor describes normal loss as ‘that loss which every claimant in a like 
situation will suffer’.56  Consequential losses are those which are ‘special to the 
circumstances of the claimant’.57  Normal loss is generally measured by the difference 
in market value between what the claimant should have received under the contract 
and what he actually received.  Consequential losses, says McGregor, are ‘anything 
beyond this normal measure, such as profits lost or expenses incurred through the 
breach, and are recoverable if not too remote’.58  In torts not concerning property,59 
the defendant is generally only liable for consequential losses, not normal, or 
expectation, losses.  Fuller and Perdue famously described damages based on the 
expectation interest as a ‘queer kind’ of compensation.60  For, they argued, 
‘the loss which the plaintiff suffers (deprivation of the 
expectancy) is not a datum of nature but the reflection of a 
normative order.  It appears as a “loss” only by reference to an 
unstated ought.  Consequently, when the law gauges damages by 
the value of the promised performance it is not merely measuring 
a quantum, but is seeking an end, however vaguely conceived 
this end may be.’61
The end that the law seeks is the fulfilment of promises:62 it seeks to vindicate the 
claimant’s performance right. 
This vindicatory function underlying the duty to compensate is evident not just 
in the law’s recognition and enforcement of the expectation interest itself, but also in 
the way the expectation interest is measured.  The starting position is that the claimant 
can recover damages for the difference in value between what he received and what 
he should have received together with any consequential losses, such as loss of profit, 
                                                 
50 ‘The way in which the Court of Appeal dealt with the case suggests it misunderstood the effect of the 
rules that were identified in Hadley v. Baxendale … They are very familiar to every student of contract 
law.  Most would claim to be able to recite them by heart.’  Per Lord Hope in Jackson v. Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc [2005] UKHL 3; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 377 at para. 25. 
51 Or, more likely, under s.2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
52 ‘[T]he correct measure of damages in the tort of deceit is an award which serves to put the claimant 
into the position he would have been in if the representation had not been made to him, and not, as with 
breach of condition or warranty in contract, into the position he would have been in if the 
representation had been true’: McGregor on Damages at para. 41-002 (footnotes omitted). 
53 In deceit, as in negligence, damage is the gist of the action: Smith v. Chadwick (1884) 9 App. Cas. 
187 at 196 per Lord Blackburn.  See Winfield & Jolowicz at para. 11-3. 
54 Other than torts concerning property ‘which in this respect are similar to contract’ (McGregor on 
Damages at para. 1-036). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See ibid. 
60 Fuller, L. and Perdue, W., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages [1936] 46 Yale L.J. 52 at 53. 
61 Ibid. 
62 In Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49; [2002] 2 A.C. 732 at para. 25, Lord Steyn described contract 
law’s central purpose as ‘promoting the observance of contractual promises’. 
 6
which are not too remote.  Where there is no difference in value, and no consequential 
loss, an award of nominal damages, if available, may be an adequate means of making 
good the performance right.  Suppose that the defendant agrees to sell 1,000 rubbish 
bins to the claimant.  The contract specifies that the bins are to be black in colour but 
the bins delivered by the defendant are grey and not black.  The defendant made no 
saving by supplying grey and not black bins.  Nor does it make any difference to the 
claimant: the bins are perfectly fit for their intended purpose and are worth the same 
amount of money.  The claimant’s compensation will be nil.63  An award of 
substantial damages would represent an unjustified windfall in the claimant’s hands. 
But compare this situation with that in Radford v. De Froberville where the 
claimant sold part of his land to the defendant.64  The defendant covenanted to build 
at her expense a wall on her side of the boundary line dividing her property from the 
land retained by the claimant.  The defendant failed to build the wall and sold her 
land to a third party.  The claimant sued the defendant for breach of covenant.  As the 
land was now owned by a third party, specific relief was not available and so the 
claimant sought damages.65  The defendant argued that the claimant’s damages 
should be measured by the diminution in value of his land, the difference between the 
value of the claimant’s land with a boundary wall and without.  The evidence 
suggested that there was no difference.  Oliver J. however held that the claimant was 
entitled to damages measured by the cost of cure, the amount of money it would cost 
to have the wall built.  This was despite the fact that the claimant let out the property 
to tenants and was ‘realistically, merely a landlord with an investment property’ who 
wanted the work done for the benefit of his tenants.66  Oliver J. invoked the general 
principle that pacta sunt servanda.67  The claimant ‘had a contractual right to have 
the work done’ and wanted the wall built.68  Where a claimant contracts for 
something and the defendant fails in breach of contract to supply that thing, ‘I do not 
see why, in principle, [the claimant] should not be compensated by being provided 
with the cost of supplying it through someone else or in a different way’.69  Radford 
demonstrates that compensatory damages involve more than the mere making good of 
a loss.  Their purpose is to put the claimant, as far as money can, in the same position 
as if the contract had been performed: their purpose is to vindicate the performance 
right.  Where awarding the difference in value will make good the performance right, 
that measure will be adopted.  But where the claimant’s expectation will only be 
satisfied by getting the very thing contracted for, the court will award cost of cure 
damages.70   
That compensation is a means to an end and not an end in itself, is further 
suggested by a variety of limitations which, in practice, mean that damages may not 
provide a precise indemnity for loss arising from a breach of contract.  A claimant 
                                                 
63 S.53(3), Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides that the damages are the difference between the value of 
the goods at the time of delivery and the value they would have had had they conformed to the 
contract.  Note however that, subject to s.15A of the Act, the buyer may be able to reject the goods 
under s.13. 
64 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262. 
65 And the claimant would have to build the wall on his own land: see, ibid., at 1267. 
66 Ibid., at 1285.  The garden was not included in the leases, although the tenants had the right to use it: 
see ibid., at 1264. 
67 Ibid., at 1270. 
68 Ibid., at 1285. 
69 Ibid., at 1270.  This was however, ‘subject to the proviso, of course, that he is seeking compensation 
for a genuine loss and not merely using a technical breach to secure an uncovenanted profit.’  (Ibid.) 
70 Unless cost of cure damages would be unreasonable or oppressive: see Ruxley v. Forsyth, below. 
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cannot recover for loss which is too remote; so the mill-owner in Hadley v. Baxendale 
was not awarded the profits he lost by reason of the carrier’s failure to return the 
crankshaft in good time.71  Further, no liability attaches as regards a loss which the 
claimant could reasonably have avoided.  So the buyer of the vessel, The Solholt, was 
unable to recover the difference between the contract and market prices when the 
defendant was late in tendering delivery, as the court concluded that he should have 
offered to purchase the vessel at the original contract price.72  Another bar to full 
recovery is the decision of the House of Lords in London, Chatham & Dover Railway 
Co. v. South Eastern Railway Co. which prevents a claimant from recovering interest 
by way of general damages for the late payment of a debt.73  Historically rules 
applicable to particular types of contract might mean that a claimant did not recover 
the entirety of his loss.  Thus according to the rule in Bain v. Fothergill a vendor’s 
failure to deduce good title to the land being sold would result only in liability for 
reliance, and not expectation, losses.74
A further limit upon the recovery of full compensation may be seen to arise 
from the decision in the SAAMCO case.75  There, surveyors employed by mortgagees 
had negligently overvalued commercial property to the extent that when, following 
the mortgagor’s default, the security was realised, the proceeds of sale were 
insufficient to discharge the outstanding debt.  The House of Lords held that the 
negligent surveyors were not automatically liable for the entire shortfall.  Rather they 
were only liable in respect of the extent to which they had overvalued the premises; in 
so far as the mortgagees’ losses exceeded this ‘initial security shortfall’ the losses 
were irrecoverable.  The SAAMCO principle, that ‘a defendant is not liable in 
damages in respect of losses of a kind that fall outside the scope of his duty of care’,76 
has subsequently been applied widely77 to contractual and tortious duties of care 
owed by valuers and surveyors towards vendors,78 purchasers79 and others.80  Recent 
                                                 
71 (1854) 9 Exch. 341. 
72 [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 605. 
73 [1893] A.C. 429.  The rule is subject to any contrary provision in the contract: see Chitty on 
Contracts at para. 38-249.  Further, interest may be recoverable by way of special damages: see 
Wadsworth v. Lydall [1981] 1 W.L.R. 598.  See also the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) 
Act 1998. 
74 (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158.  The rule was abolished by s.3 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1989. 
75 South Australia Asset Management Corp. v. York Montague Ltd. (on appeal from Banque Bruxelles 
Lambert S.A. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd.) [1997] A.C. 191.  See Platform Home Loans Ltd. v. 
Oyston Shipways Ltd. [2000] 2 A.C. 190 at 207 per Lord Hobhouse, and Burrows, A., Remedies for 
Torts and Breach of Contract, 3rd edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at pp. 109-122. 
76 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Johnson and Higgins Ltd. [2001] UKHL 
51; [2001] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 929 per Lord Lloyd at para. 10. 
77 The principle does not apply where the defendant’s duty extends beyond one to provide information 
upon which the claimant will base his decision, to one to advise the claimant as to what decision to 
make: see, e.g., Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Johnson & Higgins Ltd. 
[2001] UKHL 51; [2001] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 929 (insurance brokers who had assumed duty to advise 
on availability of reinsurance were liable for client’s full loss) and Keydon Estates Ltd. v. Eversheds 
LLP [2005] EWHC 972 (Ch); [2005] All E.R. (D.) 312 (May) (negligent solicitors who knew client 
was purchasing property as investment were liable for all lost rental). 
78 Trustees of WASPS Football Club v. Lambert Smith Hampton Group [2004] EWHC 938 (Comm); 
[2004] 3 E.G.L.R. 149. 
79 Woolfson v. Gibbons [2002] All E.R. (D.) 69 (Jan.). 
80 HOK Sport Ltd. v. Aintree Racecourse Co. Ltd. [2002] EWHC 3094 (TCC); [2003] Lloyd’s Rep. 
P.N. 148 (action by client against architect), Singh v. Sardar Investments Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 1706; 
[2002] All E.R. (D.) 476 (Oct.) (action by purchaser of property against agent who did not have 
principal’s authority to sell) and Weston v. Gribben [2005] EWHC 2953 (Ch); [2005] All E.R. (D.) 304 
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cases also support a wider scope of application to include a duty to avoid physical, as 
well as economic, harm.81  
On the other hand, the claimant’s damages may exceed the amount of loss 
caused by the breach of contract.  So the factory owner in Harbutt’s “Plasticine” Ltd. 
v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. was awarded damages sufficient to enable him to 
build a new factory superior to that destroyed by the defendant’s breach of contract.82  
Similarly, application of the res inter alios acta principle may leave a claimant with a 
windfall gain.  Thus a buyer of defective goods who manages to sell the goods on to a 
sub-buyer at full price may recover damages from the seller measured by the notional 
difference in value between the goods as delivered and as they should have been 
under the contract.83  In yet other cases the damages awarded may bear no relation to 
the actual loss suffered.  In Cory v. Thames Ironworks and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. the 
claimant recovered damages for profits lost by not being able to use the subject matter 
of the contract, a boom derrick, as a coal store.84  However the claimant had never 
intended to use the derrick in that way: he wanted to use it to tranship coal to barges 
and his inability so to do gave rise to much higher losses, but losses which were too 
remote to be recoverable.85  In some situations, the parties to a contract may prefer to 
agree in advance what damages are to be paid in the event of breach of a particular 
term: they may choose to include in their agreement a liquidated damages clause.  To 
be enforceable, the agreed sum must be a genuine pre-estimate of the likely loss,86 the 
genuineness of the pre-estimate being judged at the time of contracting.87  This 
requirement satisfied, the defendant will be liable for the agreed sum irrespective of 
the loss actually caused by the breach.88 Given the limited ability of contractors to 
anticipate the future, it is, in a sense, inevitable that the stipulated damages clause will 
either under-compensate89 or over-compensate90 the victim of the breach. Thus the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Dec.) (action by property owner against notary who validated documents and government department 
which certified authenticity of signature). 
81 Thames Water Utilities Ltd v. London Regional Transport [2004] EWHC 2021 (TCC); [2004] All 
E.R. (D.) 96 (Aug.) at para. 11 per Judge David Wilcox: ‘There is sufficient authority for the 
proposition that there should be a single test of causation applicable to the same set of facts, 
irrespective of whether the case is pleaded in negligence, nuisance or for a statutory breach.’  See also 
Mattis v. Pollock (trading as Flamingos Nightclub) [2002] EWHC 2177 (QB); [2002] All E.R. (D.) 
373 (Oct.) at paras. 91-93 (nightclub owner not vicariously liable for attack by doorman outside club); 
decision on liability reversed at [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2158. 
82 [1970] 1 Q.B. 447.  The decision as to liability was overruled by the House of Lords in Photo 
Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, but the reasoning as to quantum would 
appear to remain unaffected.  See also Voaden v. Champion, the Baltic Surveyor and Timbuktu [2002] 
EWCA Civ 89; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 623. 
83 See Rodocanachi v. Milburn (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 67 and Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd. [1920] 2 K.B. 
11.  Cf. Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd. [1988] Q.B. 87 at 102 where Auld L.J. 
thought that the time had come for Slater’s case to be reconsidered.  See now Transfield Shipping Inc. 
v. Mercator Shipping Inc., the Achilleas [2006] EWHC 3030 (Comm); [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19. 
84 (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 181. 
85 Ibid., at 189-192. 
86 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] A.C. 79. 
87 Public Works Commissioner v. Hills [1906] A.C. 368 at 376 per Lord Dunedin; repeated in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] A.C. 79 at 86–87.  See now 
Murray v. Leisureplay plc [2005] EWCA Civ 963; [2005] I.R.L.R. 946 per Arden L.J. at para. 69 and 
Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd. v. Tilebox Ltd. [2005] EWHC 281 (TCC); [2005] Con. L.R. 39 
per Colman J. at para. 61. 
88 See Chitty on Contracts at para. 26-109. 
89 Diestal v. Stevenson [1906] 2 K.B. 345 (£90 recovered under liquidated damages clause when 
defendant’s agreed losses were £320) 
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court may, in effect, sanction liability for a substantial sum as damages where no loss 
has been suffered.91  The same dissociation between recovery and loss occurs where a 
deposit is forfeit as a result of the payor’s breach of contract.92  While there are a 
number of torts where a claimant may recover substantial damages without showing 
actual damage,93 the only contractual equivalent appears to lie in claims for damage 
to reputation, such as an action against a bank for wrongful failure to honour a client’s 
cheques,94 or an action for loss of publicity.95  Nonetheless, such claims provide 
another example of the court condoning the recovery of substantial damages where no 
loss may have been suffered. 
 
The scope of the vindicatory function 
Thus far the aim has been to show that the principal motive in the award of 
compensatory damages is the vindication of the claimant’s performance right: that the 
making good of the performance right rather than the mere making good of a loss lies 
at the heart of the liability for damages for breach of contract.  To support this, 
reference has been made to various shortcomings of damages as a loss-filling device.  
Thus far then, the analysis has focused on the application of orthodox compensatory 
principles.  Yet the vindicatory impulse may be seen to be more pervasive in its extent 
and more radical in its means.  The need to award damages which vindicate the 
claimant’s performance interest may require a departure from conventional 
compensatory principles.  Take the extension of the Dunlop v. Lambert principle to 
building contracts.96  Dunlop has been described as probably the only true exception 
to the general rule of English law that in an action for breach of contract a claimant 
may only recover substantial damages for loss which he himself has suffered.97  The 
rule in Dunlop, as interpreted by Lord Diplock in The Albazero,98 ‘allows a consignor 
of goods to recover from the carrier in full in respect of loss or damage to the goods in 
transit even though he has parted with all property in the goods before they are lost or 
                                                                                                                                            
90 In Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda 
[1905] A.C. 6 at 10, the House of Lords rejected the somewhat disingenuous argument of a seller that 
he was not liable for liquidated damages in respect of his failure to deliver a number of torpedo boats 
because, if they had been tendered on time, they would have been lost in a disastrous naval engagement 
which subsequently took place. 
91 Clearly, the reason for so doing is not simply to vindicate the claimant’s performance right: 
enforcement of a liquidated damages clause which contains a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss has 
the advantages of greater certainty for the parties and of avoiding the cost, inconvenience, and delay of 
proving actual loss. These traditional justifications for the enforcement of liquidated damages clauses 
may be overstated: see further, Furmston, M., (ed.), The Law of Contract 3rd edn., (London: 
Butterworths, 2007) at para. 8.106. 
92 Only a reasonable deposit may be forfeit unless, as with sales of land, there is some other 
conventional level of deposit taking: Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. 
[1993] A.C. 573. 
93 Such as libel (Tripp v. Thomas (1824) 3 B. & C. 427), inducing breach of contract (Goldsoll v. 
Goldman [1914] 2 Ch. 603), and trespass to goods (GWK Ltd v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. (1926) 42 
T.L.R. 376; see below). 
94 Wilson v. United Counties Bank Ltd. [1920] A.C. 102, Kpohraror v. Woolwich Building Society 
[1996] 4 All E.R. 119.  See also Aerial Advertising Co. v. Batchelors Peas Ltd. (Manchester) [1938] 2 
All E.R. 788, where, in the context of an advertising contract, Atkinson J. awarded general damages for 
pecuniary loss. 
95 See, e.g., Herbert Clayton and Jack Waller, Ltd. v. Oliver [1930] A.C. 209.  See also damages in the 
former action for breach of promise of marriage: Smith v. Woodfine (1857) 1 C.B. (N.S.) 660 (the 
cause of action was abolished by s.1, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970.  
96 Dunlop v. Lambert (1839) 6 Cl. & F. 600. 
97 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd. v. Panatown Ltd. [2001] 1 A.C. 518 at 582 per Lord Millett. 
98 [1977] A.C. 774 at 847. 
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damaged and thus suffers no loss’.99  In St. Martins v. McAlpine this principle was 
applied so as to allow a developer to recover from a builder substantial damages, 
representing repair costs, for breach of a building contract, in circumstances where the 
developer had, before the breaches of contract occurred, transferred its interest in the 
land being developed to a third party.100
The approach in St Martin’s, and in the subsequent case of Darlington v. 
Wiltshier,101 represents a significant extension of the Dunlop principle, an extension 
which demonstrates the increasing willingness of the courts to fulfil a vindicatory 
function.  In the carriage of goods scenario, from which the Dunlop principle arises, 
‘it is the loss to the proprietary or possessory interest that is compensated, not some 
other or different economic loss’.102  The essence of the Dunlop principle is 
compensation for the diminution in value of an asset.  It involves the enforcement of 
the claimant’s contractual rights so as to compensate a third party for a diminution in 
the value of the third party’s assets brought about by the defendant’s wrong.  The 
object, therefore, of the Dunlop principle is the vindication of the third party’s 
property rights.103  By contrast, in St Martin’s, the damages did not relate to loss to 
the proprietary or possessory interest, but to the expectation interest created by the 
contract.  The damages represented compensation for a failure to enhance the value of 
certain assets in the manner bargained for by the claimant.  The builder’s wrong had 
not caused any diminution in the value of the third party’s assets.  He had failed to 
enhance the value of those assets but he was under no duty to the third party to do so.  
The damages in St Martin’s cannot be said to represent the vindication of the third 
party’s property rights.  The essence of the St Martin’s principle is the non-
enhancement of the value of an asset: that is an economic interest protected by the law 
of contract, not a proprietary interest protected by the law of tort.  St Martin’s 
involves the enforcement by the claimant of his contractual rights against the 
defendant so as to compensate a third party for the non-enhancement of the value of 
the third party’s assets brought about by the defendant’s breach of contract.104  In St 
Martin’s the court is vindicating contractual rights.105
                                                 
99 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd. v. Panatown Ltd. [2001] 1 A.C. 518 at 582 per Lord Millett.  The 
consignor must account to the consignee for the damages recovered (ibid.). 
100 St Martins Property Corporation Ltd. v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. (heard with Linden Gardens 
Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd.) [1994] 1 A.C. 85.   
101 Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68. 
102 Obestain Inc. v. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd., the Sanix Ace [1987] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 465 at 469 per Hobhouse J.   
103 That the complaint in a contract of carriage case where goods are delivered in a damaged condition 
or are delivered late, relates to the underlying property interest in the cargo is demonstrated by the fact 
that freight remains payable: no right to an abatement arises.  See Colonial Bank  v. European Grain 
and Shipping Ltd., the Dominique [1989] A.C. 1056 and Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v. Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd. [1994] 1 A.C. 85 at 111-112 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
104 Thus in a building contract, a right to an abatement of the price will arise whether or not the 
claimant has retained ownership of the development: see Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd.  v. Gilbert-
Ash (Northern) Ltd. [1974] A.C. 689.  The breach ‘involves a failure to provide the very goods or 
services which the defendant had contracted to supply’: Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v. Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd. [1994] 1 A.C. 85 at 111-112 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
105 The broad ground adopted by Lord Griffiths in St Martin’s [1994] 1 A.C. 85 at 96-98 and the 
approach of the minority in Panatown ([2001] 1 A.C. 518) involve, on the face of it, a more obvious 
vindicatory element: the claimant is recovering for his own loss, not that of a third party.  But in 
practice the approach may not differ greatly.  In St Martin’s, Lord Griffiths clearly envisaged a 
situation where the claimant himself had already incurred the cost of repairs to the third party’s 
property ([1994] 1 A.C. 85 at 96).  In Panatown, Lord Goff of Chieveley thought that ‘any damages 
recovered by Panatown from McAlpine by reason of the defective state of the building will be 
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The most striking example of the development of the vindicatory function is the 
decision of the majority of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Blake.106  In 
1966, Blake, a notorious double agent escaped from Wandsworth prison, where he 
was serving a 42 year sentence for breaches of the Official Secrets Act 1911, and fled 
to Russia.  In 1989, Blake entered into a contract with Jonathan Cape for Cape to 
publish his autobiography.  Cape agreed to pay advance royalties to Blake, and by the 
time of the proceedings about £90,000 of these remained payable.  Disclosure of 
material contained in the book constituted a breach of by Blake of the confidentiality 
undertaking given immediately before his employment by the Crown.  It was clear 
that the Crown suffered no loss from the breach of contract.  Nevertheless, the Crown 
was held to be entitled to claim the sums due from Cape to Blake by means of an 
account of profits. 
‘In the same way as a plaintiff's interest in performance of a 
contract may render it just and equitable for the court to make 
an order of specific performance or grant an injunction, so the 
plaintiff's interest in performance may make it just and 
equitable that the defendant should retain no benefit from his 
breach of contract.’107   
Here the Crown could demonstrate a ‘legitimate interest in preventing [Blake’s] 
profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of his profit’.108  The majority, in 
effect, awarded an equitable remedy for breach of fiduciary duty where no such duty 
existed.109   
 
Vindicatory damages 
The second argument put forward in this article builds on the first.  In fulfilling their 
vindicatory function, the courts may be seen to have developed a distinct measure of 
damages.  Such damages, vindicatory damages, are not compensatory, or loss-based, 
in the orthodox sense; nor are they restitutionary, or gain-based.  They are better 
conceived as rights-based damages.110  Rights-based damages have to date only been 
explicitly recognised in the field of constitutional rights.111  The Privy Council has 
                                                                                                                                            
available for making good the defects in the structure, and will no doubt be used, directly or indirectly, 
for that purpose’ ([2001] 1 A.C. 518 at 560).  Lord Millett thought that Panatown would hold the 
damages on trust to be applied at the direction of the group company which had provided the finance 
for the construction work (ibid., at 592-593). 
106 [2001] 1 A.C. 268.  In Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Niad Ltd. [2001] EWHC 6 (Ch); [2001] All E.R. 
(D.) 324 (Nov.) Morritt V.-C. applied Blake and held that the claimant was entitled to an account of 
profits.  The remedy was refused in Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. PPX Enterprises Inc. [2002] EWCA 
Civ 323; [2003] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 830, World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation 
[2001] All E.R. (D.) 50 (Aug.), and, The Sine Nomine [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 805. 
107 [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 285 per Lord Nicholls. 
108 Ibid. 
109 At trial the Attorney General had unsuccessfully argued that Blake was in breach of fiduciary duties 
he owed to the Crown by virtue of his service.  Scott V.-C. dismissed the claim; while a member of the 
secret and intelligence service owed a lifelong duty of non-disclosure in respect of secret and 
confidential information, the law did not impose a duty which went beyond this.  In the present case, 
none of the material disclosed by Blake remained confidential.  See [1997] Ch. 84. 
110 See Dunlea v. Attorney General [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 136 at para. 68 where Thomas J. speaks of 
damages under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act necessitating a ‘rights-centred approach’. 
111 See The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 A.C. 
328 and Merson v. Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38; [2006] 3 L.R.C. 264.  To date, the availability in 
English law of vindicatory damages for infringement of constitutional rights is uncertain.  However 
their recognition would raise an interesting issue as to their compatibility with damages under the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  The refusal by the House of Lords in R. (on the application of Greenfield) v. 
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acknowledged that where a constitutional right has been violated, an award of 
compensatory damages may not suffice as the fact that the infringed right is a 
constitutional right adds an extra dimension.112  In such a case, damages ‘may be 
compensatory but should always be vindicatory’.113  For, as Thomas J. observed in 
Daniels v. Thompson: 
‘Compensation recognises the value attaching to the plaintiff’s 
interest or right which is infringed, but it does not place a value 
on the fact the interest or right ought not to have been infringed 
at all.’114
In Merson v. Cartwright the trial judge, Sawyer J., had awarded the claimant 
$100,000 as damages for infringement of her constitutional rights on top of general 
damages of $180,000 for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution.  The Privy Council upheld the award of the constitutional damages.  The 
purpose of these damages ‘is to vindicate the right of the complainant, whether a 
citizen or a visitor, to carry on his or her life in the Bahamas free from unjustified 
executive interference, mistreatment or oppression.’115  In the earlier case of 
Ramanoop, the Privy Council likewise upheld an award of vindicatory damages made 
by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago in respect of appalling misbehaviour 
by a police office towards the claimant.116  In reaching its conclusion in Ramanoop, 
the Privy Council derived ‘particular assistance’117 from the dissenting judgment of 
Thomas J. in Dunlea v. Attorney General.118  In Dunlea, Thomas J. concluded that 
damages under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 should not be calculated on 
the same basis as ordinary tortious damages.  In reaching that view, Thomas J. drew a 
distinction between loss-centred damages and damages which are rights-centred.  
Generally damages awarded in tort are loss-centred: the court, Thomas J. said, awards 
a figure to compensate the claimant for physical damage and mental distress.  But 
damages under the Bill of Rights Act necessitate ‘a rights-centred approach based on 
an understanding of the importance of vindicating the right now vested in the plaintiff 
as a citizen’.119  As such, damages under the Act should include an amount 
representing ‘the value of the right (or the non-violation of that right) to the 
plaintiff’.120  Vindicatory damages reflect the ‘intrinsic value’ of the infringed right to 
the claimant.121
                                                                                                                                            
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 673 to award damages 
for violation of article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms suggests, perhaps, that awards of damages under the Human Rights Act might be less 
common and less generous than awards of vindicatory damages.  See also A v. Head Teacher and 
Governors of Lord Grey School [2006] UKHL 14; [2006] 2 A.C. 363 at para. 83 per Baroness Hale of 
Richmond.   
112 The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 A.C. 328 at 
para. 19. 
113 Merson v. Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38; [2006] 3 L.R.C. 264 at para. 18.  
114 [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 22 at 70. 
115 Ibid. 
116 The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 A.C. 328. 
117 Ibid., at para. 16. 
118 [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 136. 
119 Ibid., at para. 68. 
120 Ibid., at para. 70.  Thomas J. saw vindicatory damages as compensatory (see, ibid., at paras. 66 and 
67).  The better view, it is respectfully suggested, is that vindicatory damages should be treated as 
distinct from an award of compensation: see below. 
121 Ibid., at para. 60. 
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In Ramanoop, Lord Nicholls stated that two aims, among others, of vindicatory 
damages are ‘to reflect the sense of public outrage ... and deter further breaches’.122  
As such, Lord Nicholls conceded that an award of vindicatory damages ‘is likely in 
most cases to cover much the same ground in financial terms as would an award by 
way of punishment in the strict sense of retribution’.  But punishment in this sense, he 
continued, is not the object of vindicatory damages and the expressions punitive and 
exemplary are ‘better avoided’ in this context.123  This view was echoed by Lord 
Scott in Merson.124  The overlap between vindicatory and punitive damages is evident 
in the context of tort law where infringement of what may be termed constitutional 
rights is one of the two common law categories where exemplary damages are 
available.125  Vindicatory damages may thus offer a more palatable means of 
achieving at least some of the aims of exemplary damages and the recognition of 
vindicatory damages may raise the prospect of the elimination from English civil law 
of the ‘anomalous’ remedy of exemplary damages.126
 
Vindicatory damages outside constitutional law 
As Ramanoop and Merson represent the only instances of a court awarding 
vindicatory damages, it must be asked whether such damages may be awarded for the 
infringement of rights other than constitutional rights.  The obvious argument against 
their wider availability would appear to be that constitutional rights are uniquely 
important rights.  It is the constitutional nature of the right which adds an ‘extra 
dimension’ to the claim.127  But to so confine vindicatory damages would be a 
mistake.  First, all legal rights are important: that is why they are legal rights and not 
mere social norms or conventions.  The important characteristic of Ramanoop and 
Merson ought not to be that the claims involved the violation of constitutional rights 
but that the claims involved the violation of legal rights.  Clearly, the fact that the 
right which has been violated is a constitutional right may, depending on the 
circumstances, call for a larger award of vindicatory damages than that justified in an 
action between two private parties.  But the fact the infringed right was not explicitly 
constitutional ought not of itself to preclude an award of vindicatory damages.  
Second, distinguishing constitutional from other legal rights is not straightforward.  
Thus Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, speaking in the context of identifying those torts 
which are actionable per se, said: 
‘The term “constitutional right” works well enough, alongside 
equivalent terms, in the field of statutory interpretation. But, 
even if it were otherwise suitable, it is not sufficiently precise 
to define a class of rights whose abuse should give rise to a 
right of action in tort without proof of damage.’128
                                                 
122 [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 A.C. 328 at para. 19. 
123 Ibid. 
124 ‘The purpose of a vindicatory award is not a punitive purpose.  It is not to teach the executive not to 
misbehave.’  Merson v. Cartwright [2005] UKPC 38; [2006] 3 L.R.C. 264 at para. 18. 
125 See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 at 1220-1231.  Note that Lord Devlin thought that in the 
two categories he outlined, exemplary damages could ‘serve a useful purpose in vindicating the 
strength of the law’: ibid., at 1226.  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 5th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 
2003) gives ‘punitive’ as one meaning of vindicatory. 
126 See Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972] A.C. 1027 at 1091 per Lord Reid.  See also Lord Scott’s 
speech in Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29; [2002] 2 A.C. 122. 
127 See The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 A.C. 
328 at para. 19 per Lord Nicholls. 
128  
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Third, English law has in any event historically relied on the law of torts, part of 
English private law, to vindicate constitutional rights.129  The ‘flagship of the fleet’ in 
this context has been the tort of trespass.130  Entick v. Carrington, where a jury’s 
award of £300 against messengers of the King who broke into his house and carried 
away his private papers was upheld by Lord Camden C.J., provides a well-known 
example.131  Indeed, the courts continue today to use private law as the primary 
means of vindicating some fundamental rights.132   
Nevertheless, there is an important respect in which vindicatory damages will 
have a greater role in claims involving the infringement of constitutional rights than 
contractual rights.  This is not because contractual rights are inherently less valuable 
than constitutional rights.  It is because, as has been shown, damages for breach of 
contract are generally measured by reference to the claimant’s expectation interest.  
Damages in tort generally extend only to consequential loss.133  In Dunlea, Thomas J. 
stated that damages under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act should include an 
amount representing ‘the value of the right (or the non-violation of that right) to the 
plaintiff’.134  Vindicatory damages thus recognise the ‘intrinsic value’ of the right.135  
Because of the expectation measure, contractual damages already largely achieve this.  
As well as compensating for consequential loss, damages for breach of contract 
generally compensate the claimant for the loss of value which proper performance 
would have brought.  Further, vindicatory damages will be less prevalent in the 
contractual context because breach of contract, unlike infringement of constitutional 
rights, is an ‘incident of commercial life’.136  As such, the performance right will 
generally be vindicated by compensatory damages based on the expectation measure.  
Vindicatory damages will be an exceptional remedy for breach of contract claims.  As 
will be shown below, vindicatory damages are likely to be relevant in contract where 
the breach causes no loss within the conventional meaning of loss,137 where an award 
of compensatory damages will not be an adequate remedy because all or part of the 
loss caused by the breach is not loss for which the defendant is liable to the 
claimant,138 where an award of compensatory damages would be oppressive as 
regards the defendant,139 and where the claim is for damages for loss of a chance.140
                                                 
129 See, for example, in the context of claims against the Crown, Davidson v. Scottish Ministers [2005] 
UKHL 74; 2006 S.C.L.R. 249 at para. 73 per Lord Rodger:  
‘By concentrating on judicial review, lawyers and judges today may tend to forget the 
historical importance of the law of tort or delict as a way of vindicating the subject’s 
rights and freedoms.’ 
130 Weir, T., A Casebook on Contract 10th edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at 18. 
131 (1765) 2 Wils. K.B. 275.  Based on a House of Commons Library Research Paper (06/09), 
“Inflation: The Value of the Pound 1750-2005” the award would have equated to around £35,500 in 
2005.  Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938 provides another example. 
132 See, for example, the way the courts have developed the equitable wrong of breach of confidence as 
a means of protecting privacy following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
133 Damages for torts relating to property and for libel (which may be thought of as rights-based torts) 
are exceptions to this principle. 
134 [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 136 at para. 70 per Thomas J. 
135 Ibid., at para. 66. 
136 ‘Contract-breaking is treated as an incident of commercial life which players in the game are 
expected to meet with mental fortitude.’ Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 A.C. 1 at 49 per Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon. 
137 See, for example, Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798, 
below.   
138 See, for example, Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1468, below. 
139 See, for example, Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth [1996] 1 A.C. 344, below. 
140 See, for example, Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 K.B. 786, below. 
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Entick v. Carrington141 and Ashby v. White142 may be seen as early examples of 
vindicatory damages being awarded in tort.  A more recent instance, and one 
unrelated to constitutional rights, is provided by the decision of the majority of the 
House of Lords in Rees v. Darlington.143  The claimant, who was severely visually 
impaired, wished to be sterilised as she felt that she would not be able to cope with 
bringing up a child.  Her sterilisation was performed negligently by the hospital 
operated by the defendants.  The claimant subsequently gave birth to a healthy son.  
A bare majority of a seven member panel of the House of Lords held that the 
defendant was not liable to pay for the additional cost of bringing up the child 
brought about by the claimant’s disability.  However the majority also held that 
compensation in respect of the stress, trauma and cost associated with the pregnancy 
and birth, which was recoverable, would, on its own, not give ‘adequate recognition’ 
to the reality that the claimant had lost ‘the opportunity to live her life in the way that 
she wished and planned’.144  Accordingly, the claimant was awarded an additional, 
conventional, sum of £15,000.  The damages awarded in Rees are, it is suggested, 
rights-based, or vindicatory, in nature.  Such an analysis is consistent at least with the 
approach of Lord Bingham.  Giving the leading speech, Lord Bingham said that the 
award was not intended to be compensatory, and was neither nominal nor derisory; 
rather, it ‘would afford some measure of recognition of the wrong done.’145  
Damages for personal injury are more usually, but not exclusively, sought in the 
tort of negligence.  In such actions several heads of damage are not easily explicable 
by reference to a compensatory justification.  There is equivocal support for the 
award of damages for non-pecuniary loss which extends beyond the recognised heads 
of pain and suffering allied with loss of amenity.146  Forster v. Pugh may be such an 
example.147  In this case treatment of an abdominal injury necessitated the removal of 
the claimant’s spleen and damages were awarded for pain and suffering and the 
injury itself.  Formerly, damages were awarded on a conventional basis for loss of 
expectation of life when the injury reduced the victim’s life expectancy.148  Where a 
person has died as a consequence of a tort a limited class of persons is entitled to 
claim damages for bereavement.  The damages consist of a conventional sum which 
has been progressively raised to £7,500.149  Damages for bereavement were 
introduced as compensation for the loss of the deceased’s ‘guidance’ and 
‘counsel’.150  However the damages were also regarded as a symbolic recognition by 
the State of the fact, as well as the effect, of bereavement and the manner in which it 
was caused.151  
What, in substance, amount to vindicatory damages may be found elsewhere in 
private law.  One example is an award of damages based on the so-called ‘user-
                                                 
141 (1765) 2 Wils. K.B. 275. 
142 (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938. 
143 Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52; [2004] 1 A.C. 309. 
144 Ibid., at para. 8 per Lord Bingham. 
145 Ibid. 
146 So-called ‘PSLA’ damages. 
147 [1955] C.L.Y. 741. 
148 The claim, amounting to £1,750 at the time of abolition, was abolished by s 1(1)b, Administration of 
Justice Act 1982. 
149 Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order 1990 (S.I. 1990/2575). 
150 Law Commission Report on Personal Injury Litigation: Assessment of Administration of Damages 
Law Com. No. 56 (1973) para. 172 and see now their Claims for Wrongful Death report no. 263 (1999) 
at para. 6.3. 
151 See Hansard (HL) vol. 428, cols. 41-42 and (HC)  vol. 148, col. 544. 
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principle’.152  The exact nature of these user damages has provoked disagreement: on 
the one hand, they are viewed as loss-based or compensatory; on the other, gain-based 
or restitutionary.  A review of the case law reveals support for both views.  In 
Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co. the defendants had for many 
years trespassed on the claimant’s property by tipping spoil from their colliery on the 
land.153  Each of the three members of the Court of Appeal described the damages 
awarded as compensatory.154  In Strand v Brisford155 where the defendant was held 
liable in damages for the wrongful detention of the claimants’ goods, Somervell and 
Romer L.JJ. both viewed the damages as loss-based.156  On the other hand, Denning 
L.J. characterised the damages in Strand as restitutionary.157  Lord Denning M.R., as 
he had by then become, adopted the same approach in Penarth v. Pounds where the 
defendant failed to remove his floating pontoon from the claimant’s dock. 158  In 
Ministry of Defence v. Ashman Hoffmann L.J. characterised a claim for mesne profits 
as a restitutionary claim, preferring to ‘call a spade a spade’.159  Kennedy L.J., in the 
same case, thought that the proper measure of damages was the benefit to the 
defendant of the use of the property.  However, in Attorney-General v. Blake, Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead appears to have adopted a middle course: the damages in 
these cases, he concluded, are gain-based and compensatory.160  The claimant’s rights 
have been invaded, Lord Nicholls said, but no financial loss has been suffered.161  An 
award of a ‘sensibly calculated sum of money’ therefore represents ‘compensation ... 
measured by a different yardstick’.162  Lord Nicholls concedes that to describe these 
awards as loss-based would involve giving a ‘strained and artificial meaning’ to the 
term loss.163  So instead he prefers to acknowledge that the damages are gain-
based.164
The clearer, and better, approach, it is suggested, is to view the damages in these 
cases as rights-based.  To begin, it is worth noting that these claims arise from the 
defendant’s infringement of the claimant’s property rights: by wrongfully occupying 
or using the claimant’s land or chattels, the defendant has interfered with the 
claimant’s right to possession.  The wrong is the violation itself.  The defendant owes 
a duty not to interfere, not merely to compensate for loss caused.  That user damages 
are not loss-based is supported by the Strand Electric case.  There, the Court of 
Appeal, in holding that the claimants were entitled to the full market rate of hire for 
                                                 
152 The source of the description was attributed to Nicholls L.J. in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. W. & 
J. Wass Ltd. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1406 at 1416 by Lord Lloyd in Inverugie Investments Ltd. v. Hackett 
[1995] 1 W.L.R. 713 at 718.  In the context of trespass to land, the claims are for ‘mesne profits’: see, 
e.g., McGregor on Damages at para. 34-039. 
153 [1896] 2 Ch. 538. 
154 See, ibid., at 541 (Lindley L.J.), 542 (Lopes L.J.), and 543 (Rigby L.J.). 
155 Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v Brisford Entertainments Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 246. 
156 See, ibid., at 252 and 256 respectively. 
157 ‘The claim ... is therefore not based on the loss to the plaintiff, but on the fact that the defendant has 
used the goods for his own purposes ... It resembles, therefore, an action for restitution rather than an 
action of tort.’  Ibid., at 255-6. 
158 Penarth Dock Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Pounds [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 359 at 362: ‘the test of the 
measure of damages is not what the plaintiffs have lost, but what benefit the defendant obtained’.  In 
Ministry of Defence v. Ashman (1993) 66 P. & C. R. 195 at 203, Lloyd L.J. described Penarth, with 
some degree of understatement, as a case with a ‘whiff of restitution’. 
159 (1993) 66 P. & C.R. 195 at 201. 
160 [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 278. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., at 279. 
164 Ibid., at 281. 
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the detention of their goods, overturned the decision of Pilcher J.  The learned judge 
had applied the approach adopted by the House of Lords in the Valeria,165 on the 
basis that in both cases the relevant subject-matter was a profit-earning chattel.  In the 
Valeria the claimant’s vessel had been damaged in a collision.  Lord Buckmaster said:  
‘What has to be considered is what would this vessel have 
earned for the period of the seven days that she was 
incapacitated owing to the accident; and that amount is the 
true measure of the damage which the vessel who was to 
blame is called upon to pay, and it can only be ascertained by 
considering what she had earned under similar conditions.’166
In Strand Pilcher J. accordingly awarded an amount equivalent to the actual loss 
suffered by the claimants. In doing so, he deducted from the total weekly hire for the 
period of wrongful detention sums to reflect the likelihood that the claimants would 
have been unable to hire out the switchboards for the whole of the relevant period and 
the likelihood that, had the defendants returned the switchboards in a timely fashion, 
some may have been damaged and so have been incapable of being hired out.  The 
Court of Appeal rejected this award, based as it was on the estimated actual loss.  But 
as Lord Nicholls appreciated, damages not based on actual loss cannot sensibly be 
described as loss-based unless loss is given a ‘strained and artificial meaning’.167  
Pilcher J.’s award was loss-based.  The Court of Appeal substituted a rights-based 
remedy.  Similarly in Swordheath Properties Ltd. v. Tabet,168 where the defendant 
remained in the claimant’s residential property as a trespasser, Megaw L.J. thought it 
clear ‘as a matter of principle and of authority’ that the claimant was entitled to 
damages representing the value of the property without adducing evidence that he 
would have let the property to a third party.169  Once the court dispenses with the 
requirement that the claimant prove his actual loss, it becomes hard to classify the 
award as loss-based.  Some other principle would seem to be at work.  Indeed, 
McGregor describes the awards in these cases as ‘moving away from damages’.170  
However he immediately adds that the awards are moving towards restitution.171  But, 
with respect, such a conclusion is better avoided.  To explain, it is helpful to identify 
two uses of the word ‘restitutionary’.   
The first use of restitution describes a remedy which requires the defendant to 
restore to the claimant what belongs to the claimant.  Restitution ,in this sense, effects 
the reversal of a subtraction by the defendant from the claimant’s property.172  Lord 
Hobhouse adopted this meaning in his dissenting speech in Blake, saying that 
restitution ‘is analogous to property: it concerns wealth or advantage which ought to 
be returned or transferred by the defendant to the plaintiff’.173  The essence of 
                                                 
165 The S.S. Valeria [1922] 2 A.C. 242.   
166 Ibid., at 247-8. 
167 See Attorney-General v. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 279 per Lord Nicholls. 
168 [1979] 1 W.L.R. 285. 
169 Ibid., at 288.  Lloyd L.J. adopted the same approach in the Ashman case: ‘It is true that the plaintiffs 
did not prove that they had an alternative tenant who was waiting to move in.  But that does not mean 
they cannot claim and recover damages.’ (1993) 66 P. & C.R. 195 at 203.  Lloyd L.J. doubted whether 
a restitutionary claim was even available in an action for the wrongful occupation of land (ibid., at 
202). 
170 McGregor on Damages at para. 34-045. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Thus the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 5th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2003) gives as the primary 
meaning of restitution: ‘The action or an act of restoring or giving back something to its proper owner’. 
173 [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 296. 
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restitutionary relief, according to Lord Hobhouse, is ‘the performance by the 
defendant of his obligations’: the claimant ‘recovers what he is actually entitled to not 
some monetary substitute for it’.174  Damages, on the other hand, are a ‘substitute for 
performance’.175  Lord Hobhouse thought that the remedy in Blake could not properly 
be described as restitutionary.  In this respect Blake can usefully be contrasted with 
Reading v. Attorney-General.176  Sergeant Reading, a Crown servant, assisted a 
smuggling operation in Egypt by abusing his army position.  The House of Lords held 
that the Crown was entitled to recover the money Reading received as payment from 
the smugglers.  Like Blake, Reading made financial gains from his breach of contract.  
But the remedy in Reading may properly be characterised as restitutionary since, due 
to Reading’s position as a fiduciary, the monetary gains could be treated as belonging 
to the Crown.  The House of Lords made an order requiring Reading to restore to the 
Crown what belonged to it.  Blake was not a fiduciary and the Crown had no interest 
in  the money due from Jonathan Cape.  In none of the user principle cases can the 
damages be properly described as restitutionary in this sense: in none of them did the 
sum awarded to the claimant belong to the claimant.  In each case the remedy was 
substitutionary and the claimants had no pre-existing entitlement to the sums awarded.  
The second meaning of restitution is broader and refers simply to a gain-based 
remedy or to the disgorgement of a gain.177  But damages based on the user principle 
are not restitutionary in this sense either: for they are not measured by the gain made 
by the defendant.  This is evident from the decision of the Privy Council in Inverugie 
Investments Ltd. v. Hackett.178  Here the claimant was wrongfully deprived by the 
defendant of possession of 30 apartments in a hotel complex in the Bahamas.  The 
Privy Council held that the claimant was entitled to recover a reasonable rent for the 
period for which he was deprived of possession of the apartments.  Applying the user 
principle, Lord Lloyd, delivering the judgment of the Board, concluded that the 
claimant was entitled to recover a reasonable rent whether or not he had ‘suffered any 
actual loss’.179  Likewise, the defendant was liable to pay a reasonable rent even 
though he ‘may not have derived any actual benefit’.180  In the same way that it is 
difficult to regard as loss-based those awards not based on actual loss, so too with 
supposedly gain-based damages which are awarded irrespective of any gain.  Lord 
Lloyd thought that an award based on the user principle ‘need not be characterised as 
exclusively compensatory, or exclusively restitutionary; it combines elements of 
both’.181  In other words, it may be said, the awards seek neither to compensate the 
claimant for the consequences of the wrong nor deprive the defendant of the fruits of 
his conduct.  Their aim is to vindicate the claimant’s right to possession: the damages 
represent the intrinsic value of this right, rather than the amount of any loss or gain 
consequential on its infringement.  The defendant has violated the claimant’s right to 
                                                 
174 Ibid., 297 (emphasis in the original). 
175 Ibid. (emphasis in the original). 
176 [1951] A.C. 507. 
177 See e.g., Virgo, G., The Principles of the Law of Restitution 2nd edn., (Oxford: OUP, 2006) at 3: 
‘The law of restitution is concerned with the award of a generic group of remedies which arise by 
operation of law and which have one common function, namely to deprive the defendant of a gain 
rather than to compensate the plaintiff for loss suffered.’ 
178 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 713. 
179 Ibid., at 718. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid.  Lord Lloyd seems to have viewed the damages as compensatory: see, ibid., at 717. 
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exclusive possession and he must pay for the privilege.182  Inverugie was applied in 
Roberts v. Rodney D.C. when a local authority constructed a sewer on the claimant’s 
land without permission.183  The damages payable in respect of the trespass were 
assessed as half of the difference between the cost to the Council of routing the sewer 
through the claimant’s land and the cost of the alternative available route. 
 
Vindicatory damages for breach of contract: compulsory acquisition of a right 
User damages seek to make good the claimant’s right to possession of his property.  
More recently the same principle has been applied to personal rights184 and, in 
particular, contractual rights. 
‘Property rights are superior to contractual rights in that, unlike 
contractual rights, property rights may survive against an 
indefinite class of persons.  However, it is not easy to see why, as 
between the parties to a contract, a violation of a party's 
contractual rights should attract a lesser degree of remedy than a 
violation of his property rights … it is not clear why it should be 
any more permissible to expropriate personal rights than it is 
permissible to expropriate property rights.’185
The leading case remains Wrotham Park v. Parkside.186  In 1971, the defendant 
acquired an undeveloped part of the Wrotham Park Estate, the land being subject to a 
covenant against development without the written approval of the owner of the 
Estate.  The following year, the defendant began building on the plot.  The claimant, 
the Estate owner, issued a writ seeking an injunction preventing further development 
and a mandatory injunction requiring demolition of any buildings built in breach of 
the covenant.  It did not apply for interlocutory relief.  The defendant ignored the writ 
and continued with development.  By the time the matter came to trial the defendant 
had completed and sold all the houses on the plot but remained owner of the road 
serving each of the houses on the plot.  Brightman J. held that the covenant was 
enforceable but declined to grant a mandatory injunction since to order the demolition 
of the newly-constructed houses would constitute an ‘unpardonable waste of much 
needed houses’.  The judge then went on to consider what damages, if any, ought to 
be awarded to the claimant.187  The claimant had conceded that the value of the 
                                                 
182 A statutory example of an award of vindicatory damages, it is suggested, is provided by s.117(3)(b), 
Employment Rights Act 1996  This provides for the award of an additional sum on top of 
compensation for unfair dismissal in the event that the employer declines to give effect to an order for 
reinstatement or re-engagement. 
183 [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R. 402. 
184 See, e.g., Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52; [2004] 1 A.C. 309, 
above. 
185 Attorney General v. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 283 per Lord Nicholls.  See also the comments of 
Laws L.J. in Manchester Airport plc v. Dutton [2000] 1 Q.B. 133 at 149.   
186 Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.  For more recent 
examples, see: World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2006] 
EWHC 184 (Ch); [2006] All E.R. (D.) 212 (Feb.) (reversed on other grounds at [2007] EWCA Civ 
286; [2007] All E.R. (D.) 13 (Apr.)); Horsford v. Bird [2006] UKPC 3; [2006] 1 E.G.L.R. 75; Severn 
Trent Water Ltd. v. Barnes [2004] EWCA Civ 570; [2004] 2 E.G.L.R. 95; Lane v. O’Brien Homes 
[2004] EWHC 303 (QB); [2004] All E.R. (D.) 61 (Feb.); Amec Developments Ltd. v. Jury’s Hotel 
Management (U.K.) Ltd. (2000) 82 P. & C.R. 286. 
187 Brightman J. noted that under the jurisdiction which originated with s.2 of the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’ Act) he was able to award damages in lieu of an injunction.  
Accordingly, he could award damages against the developer, as owner of the roadway, and the other 
defendants, as owners of the houses. 
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Wrotham Park Estate had not been reduced at all by the development and the 
defendant argued that accordingly the claimant was only entitled to nominal damages.  
But such an outcome struck the learned judge as being of questionable fairness.188  So 
instead, Brightman J. concluded that a ‘just substitute’ for an injunction would be 
such sum as the claimants might reasonably have demanded ‘as a quid pro quo for 
relaxing the covenant’.189
As with damages based on the user principle, disagreement dogs the proper 
characterisation of the award in Wrotham.  Dillon L.J., giving judgment in Surrey v. 
Bredero, thought that Brightman J. had interpreted Lord Cairns’ Act as granting the 
courts power ‘to award such damages as would achieve a fair result between the 
parties’.190  In the same case, Steyn L.J. said that the damages in Wrotham Park could 
only be based on the restitutionary principle.  It was a fiction, he said, to justify them 
on the basis of a loss of bargaining opportunity: their object ‘was not to compensate 
the plaintiff for financial injury, but to deprive the defendants of an unjustly acquired 
gain.’191  This view is shared by many academic writers.192  Other judges have 
viewed the award in Wrotham Park as compensatory.  In Jaggard v. Sawyer, 
Bingham M.R. was unable to accept that the award in Wrotham Park ‘was based on 
other than compensatory principles’.193  Millett L.J. in the same case thought it ‘plain’ 
that Brightman J. was adopting a ‘compensatory, not restitutionary’ approach.194  
Megarry V.-C. saw the award as quite clearly one of compensatory damages.195  In 
the more recent WWF case Peter Smith J. concluded that the Wrotham Park remedy is 
‘compensation based and not restitutionary based’.196  In his judgment in the appeal 
of that case, Chadwick L.J. thought it ‘reasonably clear’ that Brightman J. ‘took the 
view that he was making an award of compensatory damages’.197  In Blake, Lord 
                                                 
188 ‘Is it just that the plaintiffs should receive no compensation and that the defendants should be left in 
undisturbed possession of the fruits of their wrongdoing?  Common sense would seem to demand a 
negative answer to this question.’ [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 at 812. 
189 Ibid., at 815. As to amount Brightman J. thought that the damages had to be calculated on a ‘fair’ 
basis, and he assessed this as a sum equal to 5% of the developer’s anticipated profits (ibid., at 816). 
190 Surrey County Council v. Bredero Homes Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361 at 1367.  Such a conclusion, 
Dillon L.J. thought, involved the Act introducing a substantive change in the law, a possibility 
dismissed in Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367. 
191 [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361 at 1369. 
192 See, e.g., Burrows, A., The Law of Restitution, 2nd edn., (London: Butterworths, 2002) at 483; 
Virgo, G., The Principles of the Law of Restitution 2nd edn., (Oxford: OUP, 2006) at 482; McGregor on 
Damages at para. 12-023; Birks, P., “Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the 
Fusion of Law and Equity” [1987] L.M.C.L.Q. 421 at 428; and, Edelman, J., Gain-Based Damages 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 179.  Other writers are more equivocal: Tettenborn describes 
Wrotham Park as adopting ‘partly restitutionary reasoning’ (Tettenborn, A., The Law of Restitution in 
England and Ireland (London: Cavendish, 2002) at 249 (emphasis added)).  Similarly, Smith 
concludes that Wrotham Park ‘seems to mix compensatory and restitutionary aims’ (Smith, S.A., 
Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract 6th edn., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) at 413). 
193 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 269 at 281. 
194 Ibid., at 291. 
195 Tito v. Waddell (No.2) [1977] Ch. 106 at 335. 
196 World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2006] EWHC 184 
(Ch); [2006] All E.R. (D.) 212 (Feb.) at para. 137.  Peter Smith J. did however recognise that following 
Attorney General v. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 there was greater support for Steyn L.J.’s analysis.  At 
para. 111 Peter Smith J. noted: ‘Thus far [i.e. prior to Blake] Lord Steyn is a voice crying in the 
wilderness on this interesting jurisprudential debate’.  However, at para. 135 his lordship conceded that 
after Blake ‘...Lord Steyn is to some extent still in the wilderness but he might not now be necessarily 
crying loudly’. 
197 World Wide Fund for Nature v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. [2007] EWCA Civ 
286; [2007] All E.R. (D.) 13 (Apr.) at para. 29. 
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Nicholls said that Brightman J. had been right in Wrotham Park to apply by analogy 
the user principle cases.  According to Lord Nicholls, Wrotham Park shows that 
contractual damages ‘are not always confined to recoupment of financial loss’.198  
The award may be measured by the defendant’s gain.  But such damages remain 
compensatory for it is ‘axiomatic’ that damages for breach of contract are 
compensatory.199
It is respectfully suggested that Lord Nicholls is correct to concede that the 
damages in Wrotham Park are not loss-based.  For it is preferable to retain the 
coherence of loss as traditionally understood.  But, with equal respect, it is suggested 
that it is misconceived to persist with a compensatory characterisation of the award.  
The difficulty in Wrotham Park arises not because the loss cannot be expressed in 
financial terms.  As will be shown below, the courts have no difficulty in measuring 
non-pecuniary loss when awarding compensatory damages.  The difficulty arises 
because there was no loss at all.  As such, it is unhelpful to persist with a 
compensatory analysis.  Punitive and nominal damages are not based on loss and no-
one describes these as compensatory.  As Lord Nicholls appears to accept, it is simply 
not possible to explain Wrotham Park on orthodox compensatory grounds.  To begin, 
the breach of covenant caused no loss: the ‘existence of the new houses did not 
diminish the value of the benefited land by one farthing’.200  Lord Nicholls thought it 
correct to view the award as ‘damages for the loss of a bargaining opportunity’.201  
The claimant ‘lost’ the release fee it could have secured from the defendant for 
relaxing the covenant.  Indeed, Brightman J. described his award as representing ‘a 
sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded by the plaintiffs from the 
[developer] as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant’.202  However, it was accepted 
by Brightman J. that the claimant would never have agreed to relax the covenant.203  
The position of the claimant in Wrotham Park is thus analogous to that of the 
claimant in Ford v. White & Co.204  Here the claimant bought a house and an adjacent 
piece of land for £6,350.  The claimant intended to develop the plot, but his solicitor 
had negligently failed to bring to his attention a covenant against building on the land.  
The evidence showed that the value of the house and adjacent plot was £6,350, 
although it would have been worth an additional £1,250 were it not for the restrictive 
covenant.  The court held that the claimant could not recover the £1,250 as damages 
as this did not represent his loss of bargain.  Had the solicitor performed his duties 
with due care and skill and told the claimant of the covenant, the claimant would not 
have proceeded with the purchase.  Thus an award of £1,250 would not have the 
effect of putting the claimant into the position he would have been in had the contract 
been performed.  Had the contract in Wrotham Park been performed, that is, had the 
defendant not commenced development without seeking a release, the release would 
not have been forthcoming from the claimant.  Breach or no breach, the claimant 
                                                 
198 [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 283. 
199 Ibid., at 282. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid.   
202 Such damages need to be assessed by reference to a particular date.  As with contract damages 
generally, the date of breach is used: Lunn Poly Ltd v. Liverpool and Lancashire Properties Ltd [2006] 
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All E.R. (D.) 31 (Jul.).  However a later date might be used if more appropriate Horsford v. Bird [2006] 
UKPC 3; [2006] 1 E.G.L.R 75. 
203 ‘On the facts of this particular case the plaintiffs, rightly conscious of their obligations towards 
existing residents, would clearly not have granted any relaxation.’  [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 at 815. 
204 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 885. 
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would never have received a release fee.  As such, it was not open to the court to 
award damages on the loss of bargain basis, in the same way that the claimant could 
not recover the £1,250 in Ford v. White.205   
 
Vindicatory damages for breach of contract: loss of amenity 
Lord Nicholls thought that damages for the loss of a bargaining opportunity and the 
price payable for the compulsory acquisition of a right came to the same thing.206  In 
Wrotham Park then, Brightman J.’s award of damages represented the reasonable 
value of the claimant’s right to prevent development on the defendant’s land, the 
benefit of which the defendant had in effect compulsorily acquired.  The same 
principle may be identified in what, at first sight, appears to be a different kind of 
case.  In Ruxley v. Forsyth Ruxley undertook to build a swimming pool for Mr. 
Forsyth but failed to construct the pool to the depth specified in the contract.207  The 
trial judge found that the pool as constructed was perfectly safe and that the shortfall 
in depth did not adversely affect its value.  Further, the judge found that the only way 
of remedying the defect was to re-construct the pool from scratch at a cost of £21,560 
and that such cost would be wholly disproportionate to any benefit attained by having 
the additional depth.  Accordingly, Mr. Forsyth’s damages were limited to £2,500, 
being the loss of amenity value.  The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Forsyth was 
entitled to recoup the re-instatement cost, but the House of Lords restored the trial 
judge’s award. 
Lord Mustill208 rejected the argument that diminution in value and cost of cure 
were the only measures of normal loss, ‘for the law must cater for those occasions 
where the value of the promise to the promisee exceeds the financial enhancement of 
his position which full performance will secure’.209  This excess, the so-called 
                                                 
205 Nor should the damages in Wrotham Park be viewed as restitutionary.  First, they did not restore to 
the claimant something to which the claimant had a pre-existing entitlement.  Second, while notionally 
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neither loss-based nor gain-based gains further support from their analysis by Nourse L.J. in Stoke-on-
Trent City Council v. W. & J. Wass Ltd. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1406.  While describing the result in 
Wrotham Park as ‘entirely appropriate’, Nourse L.J. viewed the decision as being ‘something akin to 
an award of exemplary damages for breach of contract’ (ibid., at 1414).  While, as the Privy Council 
has noted (see The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Ramanoop [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 
A.C. 328 at para. 19), it is important to distinguish vindicatory damages from punitive, or exemplary, 
damages, Nourse L.J.’s approach is more consistent with a vindicatory analysis than a compensatory 
one.  Cf. Gafford v. Graham [1998] EWCA Civ 666; (1998) 77 P & C.R. 73 at 86 where Nourse L.J. 
states that a compensatory analysis of Wrotham Park is ‘perfectly acceptable’ as long as it is 
recognised ‘that it was not a diminution in value of the dominant tenement that was compensated’. 
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substantial damages for breach.  On this basis the claimant in Surrey v. Bredero [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361 
had no bargaining opportunity to lose: Dillon L.J. said that there had never been any possibility of an 
injunction being granted to restrain the breach of covenant; nor did the breach cause any diminution in 
value of any adjoining property owned or occupied by the claimant (ibid., at 1364).  Yet Lord Nicholls 
appears to have thought that there ought to have been an award of substantial damages in the Surrey 
case (see [2001] 1 A.C. 268 at 283).   
207 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth [1996] 1 A.C. 344. 
208 With whose reasons Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Bridge of Harwich agreed. 
209 [1996] A.C. 344 at 360.  Lord Mustill did not explicitly refer to normal loss but was clearly 
speaking in the context of such loss. 
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consumer surplus, represents ‘a personal, subjective and non-monetary gain’.210  The 
law, Lord Mustill says, should recognise this gain and ‘compensate the promisee if 
the misperformance takes it away’.211  The better view, it is suggested, is to view the 
damages in Ruxley as rights-based damages.  It is important to bear in mind that in a 
building contract the presumptive measure of compensation is the cost of cure.212  
The House of Lords held in effect that the presumption was rebutted: the relatively 
high cost to the builder, and the relatively small benefit to Mr Forsyth, of re-building 
the pool meant that damages based on the re-instatement cost would have been 
oppressive.  An award of cost of cure damages would have been oppressive as far as 
the builder was concerned, but a failure to award substantial damages would have left 
Mr Forsyth’s performance right unsatisfied.  The damages awarded are best treated as 
a ‘sensibly-calculated’ sum of money designed to vindicate the right to performance 
of the contract.  In Ruxley, there is no question of treating the damages as gain-based: 
there was no evidence that the builder derived any benefit from the skimped 
performance.  Yet the absence of any gain does not take away the requirement for a 
substantive remedy.  The builder must pay for the privilege of acquiring the right to 
derogate from the level of performance specified in the contract. 
This analysis of the award in Ruxley avoids the difficulties inherent in the 
measure outlined by Lord Mustill.  Lord Mustill’s account is problematic in its 
reference to a subjective gain by the claimant.  Diminution in value and cost of cure, 
the general measures of normal loss, incorporate an important safeguard so far as the 
defendant is concerned.  His liability under the contract as regards normal loss is 
limited by the objective standard provided by market value.  Diminution in value and 
cost of cure provide an equitable balance between the competing interests of claimant 
and defendant.  On the one hand they provide a reliable means of placing the claimant 
in the same position as if the contract had been performed.  On the other hand, they 
ensure that the defendant’s duty to compensate is not rendered unduly onerous by the 
claimant’s subjective expectations.  Now subjective loss is recoverable in contract as 
well as tort.  But it is recoverable as consequential loss and the defendant is protected 
from too onerous a liability by the remoteness rules applicable to both contractual and 
tortious claims.  Given that normal loss is ‘that loss which every claimant in a like 
situation will suffer’, it is logical to use an objective means of measurement, namely, 
the market. 
In any event, the concepts of normal and consequential loss as conventionally 
measured are capable of recognising the intangible, non-pecuniary benefit which the 
consumer surplus represents.  This is shown by Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd.213  Mr 
Jarvis booked a skiing holiday with the defendants which turned out to be a grave 
disappointment.  Lord Denning M.R. thought that as Mr Jarvis went to enjoy all the 
facilities which the defendants had promised, he was ‘entitled to damages for the lack 
of those facilities, and for his loss of enjoyment.’214  Now the failure by the 
defendants to provide the promised facilities corresponds to normal loss: it was the 
loss which every claimant in Mr Jarvis’ situation would have suffered.  The trial judge 
indeed based his award of damages on this measure: ‘The judge seems to have taken 
the difference in value between what [Mr Jarvis] paid for and what he got.’  But, the 
                                                 
210 Ibid., at 360-361.  For the idea of consumer surplus, see Harris D., Ogus A., and Philips J., 
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Court of Appeal, in increasing the damages from £31.72 to £125, in effect awarded 
damages for consequential loss, ‘his loss of enjoyment’, in addition to damages for 
normal loss.  Loss of enjoyment in the context of a contract for a holiday corresponds 
to loss of profit in the context of an ordinary commercial contract, and loss of profit 
will generally comprise consequential loss.215   
It seems clear that Mr Forsyth suffered no loss of amenity as conventionally 
measured.  The evidence indicated that the reasonable man would have attached equal 
value to, and derived equal enjoyment from, a pool of the contractual depth and the 
pool as built.  As Lord Millett noted in the Panatown case, ‘viewed objectively, there 
was no loss of amenity’ in Ruxley.216  And as Lord Scott observed of the Ruxley case 
in Farley v. Skinner:217  
‘the breach of contract by the builders had not caused any 
consequential loss to the pool owner ... it was not a case where 
the recovery of damages for consequential loss consisting of 
vexation, anxiety or other species of mental distress had to be 
considered’.218
Loss of amenity is not the sole ground of the decision in Ruxley.  Having 
expressed agreement with the trial judge’s award of damages for loss of amenity, 
Lord Lloyd observed that ‘in most cases such an approach would not be available.’219  
He gave as an example a contract for the construction of a house, where the breach 
caused no diminution in value and where the cost of cure would have been 
prohibitive.  ‘Is there any reason’, he asked, 
‘why the court should not award by way of damages for breach 
of contract some modest sum, not based on difference in value, 
but solely to compensate the buyer for his disappointed 
expectations?  Is the law of damages so inflexible … that it 
cannot find some middle ground in such a case?’220
Lord Lloyd’s approach was followed by Lord Scott in Farley v. Skinner.221  
According to Lord Scott, Ruxley establishes that ‘if a party’s contractual performance 
has failed to provide to the other contracting party something to which that other, was 
under the contract, entitled, and which, if provided, would have been of value to that 
party, then if there is no other way of compensating the injured party, the injured 
party should be compensated in damages to the extent of that value.’222  Lord Scott 
concluded that the Ruxley principle ‘should be used to provide damages for 
deprivation of a contractual benefit where it is apparent that the injured party has been 
deprived of something of value but the ordinary means of measuring the recoverable 
damages are inapplicable.’223  In Farley itself, Lord Scott thought it ‘open to the court 
                                                 
215 In Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1468, another ruined holiday case, the trial 
judge, directing himself in accordance with Jarvis v. Swans Tours, awarded damages of £1,100.  The 
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to adopt a [Ruxley] approach and place a value on the contractual benefit of which 
Mr. Farley has been deprived’.224  The deprivation of a benefit approach differs from 
the account of vindicatory damages put forward in this article in that Lord Lloyd and 
Lord Scott view the damages as compensatory.  But a compensatory approach, it is 
respectfully suggested, creates difficulties.  If a loss-based approach is adopted, the 
concept of loss becomes over-stretched because in a case like Wrotham Park it is not 
possible on conventional grounds to identify a loss.  On the other hand, if a gain-
based approach is adopted, as proposed by Lord Nicholls, the concept of 
compensation becomes over-stretched, for compensation is synonymous with loss.  A 
vindicatory analysis avoids the need to depart from conventional meanings of 
compensation and loss.  While compensation for loss represents the principal means 
by which the courts vindicate the claimant’s performance right, it is not the sole 
means.  Where the conventional meanings of compensation and loss preclude an 
award of compensatory damages, it is better to award rights-based damages than 
over-stretch well-established concepts. 
 
Vindicatory damages for breach of contract: third party loss 
A third situation where an entitlement to compensatory damages may not be sufficient 
to vindicate the claimant’s performance right occurs where all or part of the benefit of 
performance is to be conferred on a third party.  As shown above, it may be possible 
for the claimant to recover damages on behalf of the third party.  Such damages are 
compensatory.  An alternative is for the claimant to recover damages to vindicate the 
performance right.  These are not compensatory and are not recovered for the benefit 
of the third party.  Take, as an example, Jackson  v. Horizon.225  In that case, Mr 
Jackson booked a four week holiday in what was then Ceylon for himself, his wife 
and their twin boys.  The cost of the holiday was £1,200.  The holiday was a disaster.  
The defendants admitted liability for breach of contract but the parties failed to agree 
compensation.  The trial judge, directing himself in accordance with Jarvis v. Swans 
Tours Ltd.,226 awarded damages of £1,100.  The award was upheld by the Court of 
Appeal.  The judge did not divide up the award of £1,100 but Lord Denning M.R. 
thought that the suggestion by Mr Jackson’s counsel that the judge gave £600 for the 
difference in value, that is, normal loss, and £500 for the mental distress, that is, 
consequential loss, ‘may well be right’.227  Lord Denning M.R. thought that the 
family had had about half the value of a holiday which cost £1,200.  However, the 
judge’s award of £500 would appear to relate solely to the mental distress suffered by 
Mr Jackson himself: it did not cover the distress of his wife and children.  Lord 
Denning M.R. thought that the award on this basis would have been excessive.  
Nevertheless, the Master of the Rolls, with whom Orr L.J. agreed, felt able to uphold 
the award, on the ground that Mr Jackson could recover for the distress to his wife 
and children.  However, the House of Lords in Woodar v. Wimpey, while agreeing 
with the outcome in Jackson, disapproved of Lord Denning M.R.’s reasoning.228  The 
other member of the court in Jackson, James L.J., also upheld the award and seems to 
have done so on the basis that Mr Jackson booked, but did not receive, a family 
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holiday.229  This approach was approved by Lord Wilberforce in Woodar.230  Lord 
Russell of Killowen in Woodar would have adopted the same approach, saying that 
the claimant ‘paid for a high class family holiday; he did not get it, and therefore he 
was entitled to substantial damages for the failure to supply him with one’.231
A better basis for the decision in Jackson, it is suggested, is that the damages 
were, in part at least, vindicatory in nature.  Because some of the consequential loss 
caused by the breach was suffered by the wife and children, an award of damages to 
compensate for normal loss and Mr Jackson’s own consequential loss, would not 
have adequately vindicated his right to a family holiday.  The damages may be seen 
as incorporating a vindicatory element, based not on the loss suffered by the wife and 
children, but on the value to Mr Jackson of his right to a family holiday.  The award 
does not represent recovery of third party loss, but enables the court to make good the 
infringement of a contractual right where conventional principles rule out an adequate 
award of compensation.232
 
Vindicatory damages for breach of contract: loss of a chance 
A fourth instance of the availability of vindicatory damages in contract arises in the 
so-called ‘loss of a chance’ cases.  In Chaplin v. Hicks233 the defendant failed, in 
breach of contract, to afford the claimant the opportunity to participate in the final 
round of a beauty contest.  The claimant had been one of 50 finalists, 12 of whom 
were to be awarded three-year engagements with remuneration of at least £3 per 
week.  The Court of Appeal upheld the jury’s award of £100 damages.  In the same 
way that the damages in Wrotham Park cannot be considered as compensatory in the 
orthodox sense, nor can the award in Chaplin.  The damages did not seek to put Miss 
Chaplin into the position she would have been in had the contract been performed.  
Had the contract been performed, Miss Chaplin would either have won an 
engagement, worth significantly more than £100, or won nothing at all: she would 
not, on either outcome, have been £100 better off.234  The same applies to the claim in 
Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc.235  When Mr Spring’s contract with the 
defendants was terminated he sought a position with Scottish Amicable.  Scottish 
Amicable sought a reference from the defendants.  The reference was negligently 
prepared and was, according to the trial judge, the ‘kiss of death’ as far as Mr 
Spring’s employment hopes were concerned.236  Having received the reference, 
Scottish Amicable wanted nothing more to do with him.237  In the House of Lords the 
cause of action was treated mainly as one arising in tort, but a majority of the law 
lords clearly envisaged liability in contract.238  The case was remitted to the Court of 
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Appeal for consideration of whether the breach of duty had caused Mr Spring loss.  
But, as Lord Lowry emphasised: 
‘[Mr Spring] only has to show that by reason of that negligence 
he has lost a reasonable chance of employment (which would 
have to be evaluated) and has thereby sustained loss ... He does 
not have to prove that, but for the negligent reference, Scottish 
Amicable would have employed him.’239
Yet, had the contract been performed by the defendants, Mr Spring would either have 
been taken on or not taken on.  By awarding damages based on his chance of securing 
the position, the court would be placing Mr Spring into a position he would not have 
been in had the contract been performed.240
The damages in Chaplin, and the prospective damages in Spring, are better 
viewed as vindicatory.  On conventional principles, Miss Chaplin was unable to prove 
that the breach of contract by Mr Hicks had caused her loss: she could not prove on 
the balance of probabilities that she would have won an engagement.  But an award of 
nominal damages would have failed to vindicate her right to performance of the 
contract.  The damages represented the value of the performance right:   
‘The jury came to the conclusion that the taking away from the 
plaintiff of the opportunity of competition, as one of a body of 
fifty, when twelve prizes were to be distributed, deprived the 
plaintiff of something which had a monetary value.’241
In this way the basis of the award in Chaplin is the same as that in Wrotham Park and 
Ruxley: the damages are for the ‘deprivation of a contractual benefit where it is 
apparent that the injured party has been deprived of something of value but the 
ordinary means of measuring the recoverable damages are inapplicable.’242  In 
Chaplin the claimant’s right to performance was infringed but, on conventional 
compensatory principles, the defendant was not liable to pay substantial damages.  By 
valuing the right to performance itself, the jury in effect awarded rights-based 
damages. 
It follows that the dismissal by a majority of the House of Lords of the claim in 
Gregg v. Scott may be treated as a refusal to award vindicatory damages.243  In that 
case Mr Gregg, having developed a lump under his arm, visited Dr Scott, his general 
practitioner.  Dr Scott negligently advised that no action was necessary.  Nine months 
later, Mr Gregg visited another general practitioner who arranged for him to undergo 
tests which revealed that the lump was cancerous.  Evidence showed that at the time 
Mr Gregg visited Dr Scott, his chances of surviving the cancer had been less than 
50%.  On this basis, Dr Scott was not liable for depriving Mr Gregg of the prospect of 
a cure: on the balance of probabilities Mr Gregg had no prospect of a cure in the first 
place.  Before the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, Mr Gregg argued that Dr 
Scott’s negligence had further reduced Mr Gregg’s chances of survival, and that 
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damages could be awarded for this further reduction.  Lord Nicholls, in his dissenting 
speech, favoured an award of damages based on Mr Gregg’s reduced chances of 
recovery: 
‘In these cases a doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his 
patient involves maximising the patient's recovery prospects, 
and doing so whether the patient's prospects are good or not so 
good. In the event of a breach of this duty the law must fashion 
a matching and meaningful remedy. A patient should have an 
appropriate remedy when he loses the very thing it was the 
doctor's duty to protect.’244
Lord Nicholls accepted that his approach represented a development in the law.  To 
the extent that the remedy involved applying the loss of a chance principle to medical 
negligence cases, that may be so.  But whether an award of substantial damages to 
vindicate the claimant’s infringed right would constitute a development is less 
obvious.  Damages vindicating similar rights were, after all, made by the House of 
Lords in Rees v. Darlington245 and Chester v. Afshar.246  Just as it is hard to see why 
a violation of contractual rights should merit a lesser degree of remedy than a 
violation of property rights,247 it is hard to see why, as a matter of principle, the courts 
should be more willing to award damages to vindicate rights protecting economic 
interests than to vindicate rights protecting personal well-being.248
 
Concluding remarks 
Speaking extra-judicially, Lord Scott recently lamented the incoherence of the current 
law of damages.249  In the context of contractual damages, any incoherence would 
seem to arise from those cases where substantial damages are awarded but where the 
claimant has not suffered any loss within the conventional meaning of the term.  
While some maintain that such awards comprise restitutionary damages, it has been 
argued that such an explanation is unsatisfactory.  Restitution is better confined to a 
remedy whereby the defendant is ordered to restore to the claimant property or value 
belonging to the claimant, that is, where the defendant’s gain equates to the 
claimant’s loss.  While Reading v. Attorney-General provides an example of a 
restitutionary remedy, awards of mesne profits and user damages fall outside the 
ambit of restitution.  Even if restitution is used in a looser sense, to refer to a gain-
based remedy, restitutionary awards ought logically to equate to all or part of the gain 
actually realised by the defendant.  Just as actual loss forms the basis of 
compensatory damages, so too should actual gain form the basis of gain-based 
damages.  As has been shown, awards of mesne profits and user damages are not 
based on any actual gain.  The alternative explanation offered for these cases is that 
the remedy is compensatory.  But that either involves over-stretching the 
conventional meaning of loss.  The better approach, it has been argued, is to extend 
the availability of vindicatory damages to these cases.  Awards of vindicatory 
damages seek to make good the claimant’s performance right, and would give 
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substance to the principle that a claimant has a legally enforceable right to the 
performance of the contract.  Vindicatory damages represent one way in which the 
courts may exercise one of their principal functions: that of making good legal rights 
by the grant of adequate remedies.  While orthodox principles of contract law 
demonstrate that the vindicatory function is long-standing, it is possible to detect, 
both in contract and the wider law, a willingness to adapt existing principles quite 
radically so as to ensure that the victim of an infringed right receives due satisfaction. 
Vindication should be recognised as an important principle driving development 
of the law, and vindicatory damages as a significant means of giving effect to that 
principle.  But the importance of vindicatory damages lies not just in ensuring a just 
outcome for a claimant where no other remedy is available: vindicatory damages may 
be also used to ensure that the remedy awarded to a claimant does not impose undue 
liability on the defendant.  Chester v. Afshar is a case where an award of vindicatory 
damages would have been preferable to an award of compensation for that very 
reason.250  In Chester the defendant, a neurosurgeon, had advised the claimant to 
undergo surgery on her spine but negligently failed to warn the claimant of a small 
risk that the surgery, even if performed with due care and skill, might lead to her 
developing a particular adverse condition, cauda equina syndrome.  The claimant 
underwent the surgery, which was performed by the defendant with due care and 
skill, but later developed the syndrome.  She sued the defendant in negligence.  The 
judge found that had the claimant been warned by the defendant of the risk of 
developing the syndrome, she would not have had the surgery on that particular day 
but would have sought further advice elsewhere.  The judge did not find that the 
claimant, if duly warned, would not have undergone surgery at a later date.  The risk 
of developing the syndrome would have been the same whenever the surgery took 
place.  The House of Lords unanimously held that on conventional principles of 
causation the claim failed.251  The defendant’s breach had been neither the effective 
cause of the injury nor had it increased the risk of the injury.  On ordinary principles, 
no obligation to compensate arose.  Yet the majority held that the defendant was 
liable in damages: the defendant had been under a duty to warn of the risk of injury 
and the injury resulted from the risk.  Assuming that the damages were to be assessed 
in the ordinary way,252 the liability imposed on the defendant may be criticised as too 
onerous.  The defendant did not cause the loss, liability for which was nevertheless 
imposed on him.  The majority clearly believed that a remedy ought to be available to 
the claimant.  But the heart of the complaint was that the defendant had infringed the 
claimant’s right to be warned of the risks of the proposed operation.  That 
infringement had caused no loss on conventional compensatory principles.  An 
outright refusal of damages would have failed to vindicate the right to be warned.253  
But to impose a liability on the defendant to compensate for loss arising from the 
outcome of the surgery was unduly onerous on ordinary principles.  The better 
solution would have been to award vindicatory damages.  This would have better 
reflected the reality of the situation: that the victim’s legal rights had been violated 
but that that violation did not bring about the loss of which complaint was made. 
 
                                                 
250 [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 A.C. 134. 
251 Ibid., at para. 8 (per Lord Bingham), para. 22 (per Lord Steyn), para. 32 (per Lord Hoffmann), para. 
84 (per Lord Hope), and para. 90 (per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). 
252 The verdict at trial was as to liability only with damages being left to be assessed. 
253 As the claim arose in negligence, it would seem that the remedy of nominal damages would not 
have been available. 
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